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NOTES
A TALE OF TWO STATUTES: ZEPEDA AND THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S DESCENT INTO JURISDICTIONAL MADNESS
Luke Emmer Miles*
When Europeans began their invasion of America, they sought to
understand, legitimize, and elevate their actions through a
mythology in which they juxtaposed themselves as ‘civilized’
Christians to the ‘savage,’ heathen natives. In so doing they
maximized the differences between themselves and the Indians in
moral, biological, and cultural terms. It is not surprising that
these myths informed historical as well as first-hand and
imaginative representations of Indian-white relations for several
centuries; what is surprising is their staying power among
contemporary scholars supposedly emancipated from the
religious and racial superstations of the past.
– Neal Salisbury1
I. Introduction
What makes a person an Indian? Do they need a name like Sitting Bull
or is Jim Thorpe enough? Should they wear a headdress with war paint
under their eyes? How much Indian blood does it take to be authenticated
as a real, live Indian? History is replete with American archetypes for the
Indian, from the feather-adorned, high cheek boned logo of the Washington
Redskins to Twain’s alcohol-guzzling, hate-seething, white-folk-terrorizing
“Injun Joe.” Perhaps the real Indian is relegated to the past, having died the
day the first white foot stepped on North America, his ancestors fated to
live forever as a construct of European minds wrestling to grasp that which
they could never truly understand. Or maybe he lives in the shadow of the
“Hollywood Indian,” waiting for the day when his European visage is torn
asunder and his true face restored. In the words of one scholar, “In the
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Neal Salisbury, American Indians and American History, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN
AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY 46 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987). Dr. Salisbury is a professor of
history at Smith College. He specializes in American Indian and Colonial New England
history.
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centuries since Columbus got lost in 1492, a plethora of European social
philosophers have attempted to ‘place’ Indians within the context of a
Western intellectual tradition that never expected a Western Hemisphere,
much less an inhabited one, to exist.”2 Non-Indians have never had a clear
conception of who or what an Indian is, evidenced by Columbus’s
misnomer (calling the Native peoples of North America Indians because of
the mistaken belief that Columbus had found the Indies) that still thrives
today, in parlance and statute. It should come as no surprise that federal
courts grapple with the question of who is an Indian. But is this inquiry
within the province of federal courts to answer?
Perhaps the question of what makes a person an Indian is better
understood when broken down into two parts. First, what is an Indian, and
second, who is an Indian? Answering the first question of what an Indian is
produces parameters for Indian status determination (e.g., an Indian is
someone who is a member of a federally recognized tribe). Thus, answering
the second question becomes a matter of determining whether a person
meets those parameters set by the first question. What we can glean from
this structure of inquisition is that if the parameters are faulty, then
answering the second question accurately becomes hopelessly arduous, if
not impossible. Why is any of this important? The determination of Indian
status is at the core of the Ninth Circuit’s recent case, United States v.
Zepeda,3 and alas, the court missed the mark.
The Ninth Circuit’s use of the “Bruce Test,”4 an inadequate rendering of
guidelines for determining who is an Indian, produces problematic results
(best evidenced by their holding in Zepeda) in which the determination of
Indian status cannot be accurately achieved. Moreover, the Bruce Test
requires a court to answer a question that it seemingly does not have the
authority to answer because, under this test, a court determines whether
someone is an Indian rather than a tribe. However, it has long been
established that “Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal
2. Michael Dorris, Indians on the Shelf, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE PROBLEM
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 100. The American Indian and the Problem of History is a
fascinating collection of essays shedding light on a myriad of problems which arise in
identifying the American Indian in a history reflective of European victors.
3. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201 (9th Cir. 2013), superseding 705 F.3d 1052,
reh’g en banc granted, 742 F. 3d 910 (2014).
4. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (enunciating that because
“Indian” is not statutorily defined, “the generally accepted test for Indian status considers
‘“(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government recognition as an Indian.”’”);
see also id. at 1224 (citing United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996)); United
States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1979).
OF
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membership . . . .”5 This is true even in extreme cases where the distinction
is drawn between patrilineal and matrilineal membership.6 The first prong
of the Bruce Test, which requires a showing of Indian blood,7 is an
impermissible race classification that changes Indian status from a political
distinction8 to a racial one. This is contradictory to Supreme Court
precedent that clearly establishes that Indian within the context of federal
legislation is necessarily political to avoid unconstitutional racial
discrimination. Understanding Zepeda and its effects in context begins with
exploring the case itself. Once the details of Zepada have been sufficiently
fleshed out, one must explore the history and construction of the General
Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act to understand why the Bruce Test exists.
The next step is to delve into the Bruce Test and understand its relationship
with the Supreme Court precedent that it seemingly contradicts. Finally,
one must examine Zepeda in light of the aforementioned forays to unveil
why it was wrongly decided and how the court could have avoided the
destructive holding that was issued.
II. Tribes and Communities: A Brief History
A cursory overview of the various tribes and communities involved in
Zepeda is critical in understanding the multidimensional and often
confusing nomenclature in federal Indian law. The Zepeda opinion itself
makes reference to different political and physical communities, namely,
the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation, the Gila River Indian Community, and the
“Pima,” “Tiho,” “Tohono O’odham,” and “Tohono O’odham Nation of
Arizona.”9
The Ak-Chin Indian Community is located on the Maricopa (Ak-Chin)
Reservation in Arizona, and is home to primarily Tohono O’odham and
5. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (citing United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978)); id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145 (1973)) (“[T]ribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”).
6. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 47, 52-56 (1978) (holding that it was
within the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe’s sovereign authority to reject membership for children
born to a mother who was an enrolled member and a white man even though they would be
eligible for enrollment if the father was enrolled and the mother was white).
7. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215.
8. See generally United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (discussing that
“Indian” is a political distinction, rather than racial, which has to do with the relationship of
a person to the federal government).
9. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 201, 212 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Akimel O’odham Indians.10 Nearby, the Gila River Indian Community was
established on February 28, 1895, and is located approximately forty miles
south of Phoenix, Arizona.11 It is home to Akimel O’odham and Pee-Posh
(Maricopa) Indians.12 The Gila River Indian Community government was
reorganized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934.13 People
considered Akimel O’odham and Maricopa (Pee Posh) have been a part of
the Gila River Indian Community since its creation and are federally
recognized.14
Pima is an alternate name for both the Tohono O’odham and Akimel
O’odham, given to them by Spanish explorers.15 However, for many years
the Tohono O’odham referred to themselves as Papago,16 and the Akimel
O’odham are generally called Pima.17 “Tiho” is likely an error on the
record, which is supposed to be “T.O.” - a colloquial reference for Tohono
O’odham.18
The name Tohono O’odham may refer to many different things. There
are Tohono O’odham Indians generally and also the Tohono O’odham
Nation (of Arizona).19 The latter comprises three reservations, the San
Xavier Reservation, the Gila Bend Reservation, and the Tohono O’odham
Reservation.20 The reservations were created between 1874 and 1917, and
10. OFFICIAL WEBSITE AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY, http://www.ak-chin.nsn.us/
index.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). Although the court refers to the “Ak-Chin Indian
Reservation,” this is technically a misnomer because it is more properly the Maricopa (AkChin) Reservation.
11. NATIVE AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 452 (Mary B.
Davis ed., 1996) [hereinafter DAVIS].
12. Tribal History, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY,
http://www.gilariver.org/index.php/about-tribe/profile/history/115-tribal-history (last visited
Sept. 14, 2014).
13. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 440.
14. Tribal History, OFFICIAL HOMEPAGE OF THE GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY,
http://www.gilariver.org/index.php/about-tribe/profile/history/115-tribal-history (last visited
Jan. 9, 2014).
15. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 452.
16. Id. at 637.
17. Id. at 452. Both tribes speak the same language, O’odham, and “Pima” is probably
more reflective of that than their individual traditions. Id.
18. 9th Circuit Reverses Conviction over Indian Status of Defendant, INDIANZ.COM,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2013/008249.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). “Tiho” was
taken from the testimony of Matthew Zepeda, which likely accounts for the error. Id.
19. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 637; see also United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 21213 (9th Cir. 2013).
20. Id.
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the government of the Tohono O’odham Nation was recognized by the
United States through the IRA in 1937. The Ak-Chin Indian Community, of
the Maricopa (Ak-Chin) Indian Reservation, Arizona,21 the Gila River
Indian Community, of the Gila River Indian Reservation, Arizona,22 and the
Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona23 are all federally recognized tribal
nations. The ancestry of the O’odham speaking tribes stretches back to
prehistoric times, and they have lived in and around the same area for at
least the last 400 years.24
As an additional note, holdings of the Ninth Circuit are of special
importance in the area of federal Indian law. According to the United States
Census Bureau’s 2010 results, slightly over thirty-four percent of the
population that identifies as either American Indian or Alaskan Native
resides in the Ninth Circuit.25 Consequently, the holdings of the Ninth
Circuit have a disproportionate effect on Indians, and should be afforded
closer review.
III. United States v. Zepeda: What Happened and Why?
On October 25, 2008, Damien Zepeda and his brothers, Jeremy and
Matthew, drove to the Ak-Chin Indian reservation in Arizona to the house
of Dallas Peters.26 Peters was allegedly involved in a relationship with
Zepeda’s ex-girlfriend, Stephanie Aviles.27 When Damien Zepada arrived at
Peters’s house, he confronted and attacked Aviles, who was there with
another individual. Peters tried to intervene in the conflict, and Zepada shot
him several times. Peters was seriously injured, but he did not die as a result
of the injuries.28

21. Notice of Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, No. 19, 79 Fed. Reg. 4748 (Jan. 29, 2014), available
at http://www.federalregister.gov (locate the search box in the top right corner and enter
“Indian Entities Recognized,” press search, and follow the hyperlink that bears the same
name as above).
22. Id. at 4750.
23. Id. at 4752.
24. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 452, 637.
25. U.S. Census Bureau Population Div., Annual Estimates of the Resident Population
by Sex, Race Alone or in Combination, and Hispanic Origin for the United States, States,
and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 2013), http://
factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
26. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 203 (9th Cir. 2013).
27. Id. at 203 n.1.
28. Id.
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Zepeda was charged with assault under the Major Crimes Act,29 which
provides for federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes perpetrated by an
Indian against an Indian within “Indian Country.”30 Under the Major
Crimes Act, the government must prove the defendant’s Indian status
beyond a reasonable doubt.31 Further, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit,
the first prong of the Bruce Test requires a showing that “the defendant’s
‘bloodline be derived from a federally recognized tribe.’”32 Federal
prosecutors introduced evidence at trial to prove Zepeda was an Indian,
including a document entitled “’Gila River Enrollment/Census Office
Certified Degree of Indian Blood’. The document bore an ‘official seal’ and
stated that Zepeda was ‘an enrolled member of the Gila River Indian
Community,’ and that the ‘information [wa]s taken from the official records
and membership roll of the Gila River Indian Community.’”33 The
document specified that Zepeda had a “Blood Degree” of “1/4 Pima” and
“1/4 Tohono O’Odham.”34 The Tribal Enrollment Certificate was published
in conjunction with the testimony of Detective Sylvia Soliz, who worked
for the Ak-Chin Police Department.35 Soliz testified that the Tribal
Enrollment Certificate was confirmation that Zepeda met the blood
quantum requirements for the tribe, was an enrolled member, and thus was
entitled to receive tribal benefits.36 Other evidence presented as to Zepeda’s
Indian status was the testimony of Zepeda’s brother, Matthew, who stated
that he and Zepeda, who shared the same parents, were “half ‘Native
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2014).
30. Indian Country is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Whether Zepeda’s crime fell under § 1153 was not challenged and
is not an issue here.
31. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 210; see also Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not to
Be: Who Is an “Indian Person,” 73 MONT. L. REV. 61, 63 (2012) (citing United States v.
James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1317-19 (9th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260,
1262 (9th Cir. 1979)).
32. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 210 (citing United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th
Cir. 2010)).
33. Id. at 204.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 205.
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American’” and half Mexican.37 More specifically, Matthew testified that
both he and his brother were “Pima and [T.O.].”38
The jury found that Zepeda’s Indian status had been sufficiently proven,
and convicted him on all counts.39 Zepeda challenged the sufficiency of the
state’s evidence in proving his Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Ninth Circuit upheld this challenge, and ruled that a “Certificate of
Enrollment in an Indian tribe” was not “sufficient evidence for a rational
juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is an Indian for
the purposes of § 1153 [without] evidence that the defendant’s bloodline is
derived from a federally recognized tribe.”40
The court discussed whether Zepeda’s bloodline could be traced to a
federally recognized tribe. It ultimately concluded that “[t]here [was] no
evidence in the record that the ‘Tohono O’Odham’ referenced in Zepeda’s
Tribal Enrollment Certificate refers to the federally recognized Tohono
O’Odham Nation of Arizona.”41 The court further reasoned that they were
not at liberty to assume that “Tohono O’odham” and “Tohono O’odham
Nation of Arizona” were the same, and that there was no way a jury could
conclude this beyond a reasonable doubt.42 The court never discussed the
“1/4 Pima” blood on Zepeda’s Tribal Enrollment Certificate, even though
the Gila River Indian Community, the federally recognized Indian
community that issued the certificate, is the home of the Akimel O’odham
(Pima) Indians. Because the court ruled that Zepeda’s lineage had not been
sufficiently established, the second prong of the Bruce Test was never
addressed.43
Damien Zepeda’s curious case leaves us with the following questions:
Why do we need the Bruce Test? Is the Bruce Test the appropriate way to
determine Indian status? Pending resolution of the two previous questions,
did the Ninth Circuit decide the case incorrectly?

37. Id.
38. Id. The actual record says here that Matthew said “Tiho.” But see supra text
accompanying note 18.
39. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 204.
40. Id. at 213.
41. Id. at 212 (validating Zepeda’s argument that the “Tohono O’Odham Nation of
Arizona” and not simply “Tohono O’Odham” appeared on the BIA list of federally
recognized tribes).
42. Id. at 213.
43. Id. at 214.
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IV. The Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act: Two Statutes or One?
The impetus behind the Bruce Test is the ambiguity of two statutes that
confer federal jurisdiction in Indian Country. Both the Major Crimes Act
(MCA) and General Crimes Act’s (GCA) grants of jurisdiction require
identification of the defendant as an Indian or non-Indian, but neither
statute defines Indian, seemingly leaving it up to the courts to decide.44
Although Zepeda was charged under the MCA, that statute tells us only part
of a story. The GCA, which preceded the MCA by some sixty-eight years,
is the wellspring of the MCA. The GCA was passed in 1817 and provides
federal jurisdiction for crimes committed against Indians by non-Indians in
Indian Country.45 It provides in pertinent part,
[T]he general laws of the United States as to the punishment of
offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall extend to the Indian
country.
. . . [except for] offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian . . . .46
The MCA47 was passed in 188548 to provide federal jurisdiction for
serious crimes committed in Indian Country. The statute provides: “Any
Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or

44. Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at
the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 283 (2000-2001) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
46. Id. The statute reads in full:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
Id.
47. 18 U.S.C.A § 1153 (West 2014).
48. Jacqueline F. Langland, Indian Status Under the Major Crimes Act, 15 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 109, 114 (2012).
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other person any of the [listed offenses] within the Indian country, shall
be . . . within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”49
The MCA and GCA are, in essence, intrusions into tribal sovereignty.
They are statutory mechanisms by which the federal courts can encroach
upon tribal sovereignty and exert federal power. The MCA was passed due
to legislative doubt as to tribes’ ability to maintain judicial integrity.50 The
MCA simply expands the federal jurisdiction provided by the earlier GCA.
As the Eighth Circuit properly recognized in United States v.
Whitehorse,51 the statutes, when taken together, cover anyone who commits
a crime in Indian Country, because “everyone is either an Indian. . . or
not.”52 From this perspective, the MCA seems supplementary; it is an effort
to provide federal courts with jurisdiction even over Indians when certain
serious crimes have been committed, a power which previously resided
with tribal sovereigns until divested by Congress. Federal courts did not
previously have jurisdiction to punish Indians within Indian Country under
the GCA’s limited jurisdiction.53 Indeed, the only palpable distinction
between the two statutes resides in the determination of Indian status,
meaning that the MCA was merely intended to cover those defendants who
were not covered by the GCA because they were Indians. The statutes
could be combined into one, conferring federal court jurisdiction over
certain crimes for both Indians and non-Indians, and the statutes would
have the same effect without the confusion that they currently create. The
statutes are fundamentally related, yet because they are in fact two separate
grants of jurisdiction based upon who is or is not Indian, with no indication
of what an Indian is. The courts are forced to make the determination of
49. 18 U.S.C.A § 1153(a). The statute reads in full:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a
felony assault under section 113, an assault against an individual who has not
attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country,
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing
any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
50. Langland, supra note 48, at 114-15 (discussing that the Major Crimes Act was
passed as a direct response to Ex parte Crowe Dog in which an Indian received a lenient
sentence from the tribal court for murdering another Indian, but the federal courts declined
jurisdiction).
51. United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 773.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
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Indian status on their own. For the Ninth Circuit, the remedy is the Bruce
Test.
V. The Bruce Test: The Court Plays the Role of the Tribe
In United States v. Bruce, the Ninth Circuit enunciated that: “The
generally accepted test for Indian status considers ‘(1) the degree of Indian
blood; and (2) tribal or government recognition as an Indian.’”54 The two
prongs of the Bruce Test appear to have evolved from different Supreme
Court precedent, which as it turns out, seems to be in direct and
irreconcilable conflict. Understanding the origins of the respective prongs
enables us to understand why the test seems to produce logically
inconsistent results.
“The first prong requires ancestry living in America before the
Europeans arrived . . . .”55 The Ninth Circuit has since clarified that the test
requires that the defendant’s “bloodline be derived from a federally
recognized tribe.”56 The origins of the first prong of the test can be traced
back to United States v. Rogers.57 In Rogers, a white man was accused of
murder in Indian Country. He claimed that he was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States because the GCA’s grant of jurisdiction,
under which he was prosecuted, did “not extend to crimes committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.”58
Rogers claimed that he voluntarily removed himself from the United
States to Cherokee country where he was adopted by the tribe, and he
“exercised all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee Indian” in the tribe.59
Without engaging in any discussion of whether Rogers had the political
characteristics of an Indian, or the relevant relationship with the federal
government, the court summarily dismissed his plea, noting that “Indian,”
in the context of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834,60 was a racial
54. United States v. Bruce, 94 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996)).
55. Id.
56. United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).
57. 45 U.S. 567 (1846). The Bruce Court references Rogers in support of the test in both
Bruce itself as well as United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996). Both Keys
and Bruce show that the first prong of the test is derived from the Supreme Court’s holding
in Rogers. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567; United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005).
58. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572.
59. Id. at 571.
60. Id. at 572-73. This was the statute under which Rogers was indicted. Id. The Ninth
Circuit identified it as the precursor to the MCA. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/6

No. 1]

NOTES

279

distinction.61 Rogers was “a white man, of the white race, and therefore not
within the exception.”62 The Rogers Court did more than simply reject that
“Indian” could be something other than a racial distinction; it essentially
classified “Indian” exclusively as a racial distinction. Thus, the first prong
of the Bruce Test is inherently a question of race—it serves solely as a
means to gauge whether the person in question is the proper race for
jurisdiction under the GCA. It is worth noting that sometimes the Bruce
Test is called the Rogers Test, or at least it is credited as having been first
proposed as the proper test in Rogers.63 However, Rogers summarily
dismisses any other kind of test and focuses only on the race of the
defendant.64
The second prong of the Bruce Test is multifaceted. While the first prong
focuses only on the race of the individual, the second prong “probes
whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly
sovereign people.”65 When analyzing this prong, courts have considered, in
declining order of importance, evidence of the following: “1) tribal
enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and informally through
receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits
of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through residence
on a reservation and participation in Indian social life.”66
The second prong of the test can be traced to United States v. Antelope.67
Antelope is the basis for the proposition that “Indian” is a political
distinction rather than a racial one. In Antelope, Gabriel Francis Antelope
and Leonard Davison were convicted of first-degree murder via felony-

61. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573 (“[A white man adopted into a tribe as an adult] is not an
Indian; and the exception is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians
are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of a race
generally,-of the family of Indians . . . .”).
62. Id.
63. See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225; United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979).
64. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73.
65. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456,
1461 (D.S.D. 1988)).
66. Id. (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995)).
67. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). The Bruce Court cites to St.
Cloud, as support for the second prong of the test, and St. Cloud in turn, cites to Antelope.
See Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 at 1224; St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
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murder provisions68 after robbing and killing an eighty-one-year-old, nonIndian woman on the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation in Idaho.69
Antelope, who was convicted under the MCA, argued that a non-Indian
who committed the same crime would have been tried under Idaho state
law, which did not contain a felony-murder provision. This would have
required the state to prove additional mens rea elements to convict him of
first-degree murder.70 Further, Antelope argued that the grant of jurisdiction
over “Indian” persons under the MCA was “invidious racial
discrimination.”71 The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, stating
emphatically that “Indian” in the context of federal legislation is not an
impermissible racial classification, but rather a political delineation.72
The Bruce Test boils down to a racial prong and a non-racial prong. As
applied in Zepeda, a person must meet the first prong before the court will
even analyze the second prong, which in application makes “Indian” a
wholly racial distinction. The only way that the MCA can apply is if a
person is, in racial terms, an “Indian.” The utter lack of congruence
between the two prongs is dumbfounding. The first prong rests on Supreme
Court precedent, which explicitly says that “Indian” is a racial
classification, while the second prong rests on precedent from the same
court that vehemently denies that “Indian” is a racial classification.
Moreover, both Rogers and Antelope deal with the same family of statutes.
Interestingly, Antelope makes no mention of Rogers whatsoever, rendering
the latter good law, even though it is in obvious contradiction to the more
modern precedent.
Perhaps questions as to the inconsistencies between the two opinions are
better answered by history. In the 136 years between Rogers and Antelope,
the United States abolished slavery (1865), added the Equal Protection
Clause (1968), and granted women voting rights (1920).73 In that same
time, the United States transitioned from a country that classified African
68. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643. The felony-murder provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 was
applicable to Antelope because he was being charged under the Major Crimes Act.
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643.
69. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 642.
70. Id. at 643-44.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 645 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974)) (comparing the
“Indian” preference to jurisdictional requirements for United States Senators or city
councilmen); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (discussing the refusal of
benefits for non-Indians to an Indian).
73. These dates are based on when the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments were enacted, not proposed.
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Americans as property to one in which African Americans can attend the
same schools and enjoy the same privileges as other citizens. This is to say
that both politics and the law have changed drastically in the United States
since 1841. Rogers is swaddled in antiquity and inequity, a hallmark of a
much darker time in our nation’s history when learned men believed that
“[w]hen the term Indian is used in our acts of congress, it means that savage
and roaming race of red men given to war and the chase for a living, and
wholly ignorant of the pursuits of civilized man . . . .”74 However, it is not
enough to simply declare that Rogers is wrong. The Bruce Test and its
racial prong make no sense in terms of statutory construction.
As discussed supra, the statutory grant of jurisdiction under the MCA
and GCA leaves open-ended the question of who or what is an Indian. It is
precisely this context that provides some guidance as to how that question
is best answered. Generally, Indian Country is part of a tribe’s sovereign
territory (or at least under the tribe’s dominion).75 Although many tribes
have idiosyncratic relations with the federal government, tribes normally
have inherent authority over what happens in Indian Country, even so far as
exercising power over non-members in limited circumstances.76 Congress
typically uses its power to regulate activity within Indian Country in order
to achieve and maintain a balance between two sovereigns. The relationship
between the United States and sovereign tribes is best explained by John
Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia:
[Indian tribes] may more correctly perhaps be denominated
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect
in point of possession when their right of possession ceasesmeanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relations to the
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian. They look
to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants . . . .77

74. United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 431 (1869).
75. See discussion supra note 30.
76. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 205 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that Indian tribes
have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian on Indian crime); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193, 199 (2004) (holding that tribal authority to punish nonmember offenders in Indian
Country is an inherent power of the tribe as a sovereign rather than a delegated federal
power).
77. 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 1-2 (1831).
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Federal oversight of tribal governments serves an obvious purpose - there is
desire by the federal government to have some control over tribal nations
within the United States.
The GCA allows federal regulation of crimes committed by non-Indians
where it would otherwise have been outside the grasp of federal courts. In
essence, it allows the federal government to “reach in” to Indian Country
and exercise power over a person who is outside of the jurisdiction of
United States.78 The MCA does the same with Indians. “Indian,” in this
case, does not make sense in any other terms than those of a political
identification. The MCA’s grant of jurisdiction is not over a select race; it is
over lands and people controlled by a different sovereign power: the tribe.
The GCA and MCA were not necessary passed because of a lack of federal
jurisdiction over people of a certain ancestry per se. Rather, because Indian
Country is under the jurisdiction of quasi-sovereign nations, the power to
prosecute criminals is inherent to those nations and recognized under
federal law.79 “Outside of Indian country, the Indian is the same as
everyone else in the eyes of the law.”80
It is clear that the notion of who is Indian, is, as the Supreme Court has
said, an identity vis-à-vis a relationship with the federal government: a
question of to whom one is most directly answerable, the tribal government
or the United States government.81 In reference to legislation which pertains
directly to Indians, the Court has said that statutory references to Indians
are not as “a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasisovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the
[federal government] in a unique fashion.”82

78. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (citing Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976)) (“[W]e reject the argument that denying (the Indian plaintiffs)
access to the Montana courts constitutes impermissible racial discrimination. The exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from
the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.”).
79. Id.
80. William C. Canby, Jr., Tribal Court, Federal Court, State Court: A Jurisdictional
Primer, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July 1993, at 24, 25.
81. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
82. Id.
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VI. Native Or Judge: Who Should Have the Power to Say Who Is an
Indian?
At the onset of this note, mentioned briefly was the fact that tribes have
the power to determine their own membership.83 While this has been
reaffirmed time and again by various federal courts, it exists more as a legal
optimism than anything else. How can a tribe be said to create its own
membership requirements when any number of federal entities still engage
in a determination of who is an Indian beyond asking the question of
whether or not they are enrolled in a federally recognized tribe? The answer
seems to be that the inquiring entities are attempting to determine whether
or not an individual claiming to be or not to be an Indian has the requisite
relationship with the federal government. “The definition of ‘Indian’ is the
measure of eligibility that the government uses for benefits and preferences
provided to Indians under a variety of federal programs.”84 With few
exceptions, membership in a federally recognized tribe is a necessary
precursor to being an Indian for the purposes of any federal statute.85 The
Ninth Circuit, in Zepeda, recognized that the best source of identifying
“federally acknowledged Indian tribes whose members or affiliates satisfy
the threshold criminal jurisdiction inquiry” is the Bureau of Indian Affairs’
list of federally recognized tribes published to the Federal Register (BIA
list).86 After acknowledging that there is a list created and updated regularly
by the federal government, which contains the names of every Indian
community in the nation with the requisite relationship with the federal
government necessary for federal criminal prosecution, how is it that there
is some additional factor that the courts consider when determining whether
or not federal jurisdiction exists under the GCA and MCA?
Because each tribe on the BIA list is, as a matter of fact, federally
recognized, it logically follows that enrolled members of those tribes are
federally recognized as Indians. Moreover, there is a safeguard in place
such that not just any group of people can get together and call themselves
an Indian tribe: any tribe that now seeks federal recognition must petition

83. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
84. Brownell, supra note 44, at 276.
85. Id. at 282 (pointing out only two acts, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of
1976 and the Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 which do not specifically require membership in a
federally recognized tribe).
86. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 211 (2013) (citing Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S.
186, 215 (1962)).
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the BIA.87 This process can sometimes take years, and not all tribes that
petition are accepted.88 It seems logical to assume then that if Indian tribes
are allowed to set their own membership requirements, and are also
required to petition the federal government for recognition, then at the point
that they become recognized, the federal government has in fact approved
of their membership requirements. The Bruce Test’s requirement that the
government must prove a defendant’s blood lineage to a federally
recognized tribe overrides the tribe’s ability to determine its membership
and infringes upon tribal sovereignty. It is the equivalent of denying
someone status as a federally recognized Indian when the tribe and federal
government (outside of the judiciary) have already conferred that status on
them. Continuing to use the Bruce Test takes away a tribe’s sovereign
power to determine its own members in those instances like Zepeda, where
the court holds that enrollment in a federally recognized tribe is not enough
to prove that someone is an Indian.
Additionally, the Bruce Test, by including a strictly racial component,
fails to produce accurate parameters for gauging whether someone is
“Indian” for the purposes of the GCA and MCA. The Supreme Court, as
discussed supra, has premised the legitimacy of statutory delineations
between Indians and non-Indians, at least in recent history, on the idea that
such distinctions are political and not racial.89 However, the use of blood
quantum to determine who meets the standard, on its face, is wholly racial.
It shocks the conscience that federal courts continue the masquerade that
“Indian” is something other than a racial distinction when in its application
and history, especially pertaining to the GCA and MCA, it is strikingly
clear that whether someone is “Indian” is a racial determination.
Furthermore, for some tribes and legislators, the trend in recent years has
been to move away from blood quantum requirements.90 It is disturbing that
the one area of law where race is still a major factor is in the criminal arena.
Using the Bruce Test yields untenable and biased results that run
contrary to legislative purposes. Assuming that Antelope is an accurate
rendering of Federal Indian Law, what results from applying the Bruce Test
is inconsistent. The thrust of whether someone is an Indian is not based on
whether a great grandmother was an Indian. Instead, if that person partakes
in a relationship with a tribe to the extent they answer to another sovereign
87. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (2014); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, History, and
Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487, 489–90 (2006).
88. Fletcher, supra note 87, at 491.
89. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1977).
90. Brownell, supra note 44, at 281–82.
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power beyond the federal government.91 The latter question is not one of
blood, but of self-identification. There are people born with blood derived
from federally recognized tribes that do not claim to be Indian and do not
have the requisite relationship with the federal government to be classified
as an Indian (in relation to the second prong of the Bruce Test). The
opposite is also true, especially in light of the fact that some federally
recognized tribes do not require a blood quantum.92 There is a very real
possibility that members of federally recognized tribes who fully meet the
requisite relationship with the federal government from a political
standpoint would fall outside of the scope of federal jurisdiction solely
because they cannot make a showing of blood quantum in a manner that
suits the Ninth Circuit.
This is essentially what happened in Zepeda. The court reasoned that
because “Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona” and not “Tohono O’odham”
appeared in the federal register as a recognized tribe, that Zepeda could not
be proven to have lineage to a federally recognized tribe.93 The court never
mentioned the fact that the Gila River Indian Community, the name that
appears on the federal register, is not even the name of an Indian tribe! The
Gila River Indian Community is a tribal reservation composed of two
separate tribes: the Akimel O’odham (Pima) and the Maricopa (Pee Posh).94
This relationship is similar to a more famous (albeit inverse) example - the
Iroquois Nation. The Iroquois is not a tribe of Indians, but rather is a
confederacy of separate tribal nations, and the name “Iroquois” is not listed
on the BIA list.95 Although both the Maricopa and Akimel O’odham have
been federally recognized tribes for over 100 years, neither of their names
appear as such on the BIA list.
Not only is the test that the Ninth Circuit used wholly inadequate to
serve the purpose for which it is used, but the Ninth Circuit failed to apply
it correctly. In the context of Zepeda, the name “Tohono O’odham” was
little more than a red herring. It was Zepeda’s Pima blood rather than his
Tohono O’odham blood that the court should have traced. Whether or not
the Ninth Circuit recognized that Pima was an alternate name for the
91. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646.
92. Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan J. Siebers, The Indian Child Welfare Act, MICH. B.J.,
July 2004, at 19, 21 (discussing blood quantum requirements under the Indian Child Welfare
Act).
93. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 212 (9th Cir. 2013).
94. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 452.
95. Mary Druke Becker, “We Are an Independent Nation:” A History of Iroquois
Sovereignty, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 981, 983 (1998).
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Akimel O’odham is unclear. What is clear is that the court engaged in a
narrow and wholly illegitimate interpretation of federal law by merely
scanning a list of tribal names without considering the fact that the Indian
community, whose document it rendered insufficient to serve as proof of a
bloodline from a federally recognized tribe, bore the name of neither of the
tribes comprising it.
Additional scrutiny as to a person’s Indian status makes sense in areas
outside of criminal jurisdiction because of the massive amount of federal
funds appropriated based on census findings.96 But how is it that the courts
ever decided that an inquiry beyond “Is this person a member of a federally
recognized tribe?” was necessary to determine whether someone is an
Indian under the MCA and GCA? The answer again seems to be found in
Rogers. By making “Indian” a racial distinction, the court in Rogers sought
to prevent “white men of every description” from “at pleasure settl[ing]
among [Indians], and, by procuring an adoption by one of these tribes,
throw[ing] off all responsibility to the laws of the United States.”97 Rogers
came before the MCA at a time when federal courts still lacked jurisdiction
over Indians in Indian Country. The irony of this history in the context of
Zepeda is that the same rule created by the courts to protect from people
evading federal jurisdiction is now being used to do precisely that, and at
great cost to the tribes.
VII. Dodging Race: How Could the Ninth Circuit Decided Zepeda
Differently?
Was the holding in Zepeda an inevitable result? There are three clear
ways in which the court could have avoided such a devastating holding.
First, the primary object of this note, is to denounce the Bruce Test. By
limiting the inquiry into the defendant’s Indian status to whether or not he
was an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe, the court would
never need to decide this issue of blood. Second, the court could have
followed the dissent, which “disagree[d] with the majority’s ultimate
determination that the government failed to present sufficient evidence
from which a rational jury could infer that Zepeda has a blood connection
to a federally recognized tribe.”98 Third, and perhaps better still, the court
could have followed the Eighth Circuit’s precedent.

96. Brownell, supra note 44, at 276.
97. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
98. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 214 (Watford, J., dissenting).
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The Eighth Circuit case, United States v. White Horse,99 provides a clear
alternative to the Bruce Test, which is particularly applicable to Zepeda. In
White Horse, the defendant, Guy White Horse, was charged with sexual
molestation of his six-year-old son under the GCA.100 He appealed his
conviction, arguing that he was in fact an Indian, and the government had
failed to meet their evidential burden of proving that he was not.101 The
court held there was no plain error:
[B]ecause of the complementary nature of § 1152 and § 1153.
There is no contention that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that Mr. White Horse committed the physical acts
charged in the indictment, and regardless of which statute
applied (one of them certainly did) Mr. White Horse was guilty
of a federal crime because he, like everyone else, is either an
Indian or he is not . . . . [W]e believe that the situation here is the
same as it would be if we were dealing not with two statutes but
with a single one that provided that it applied whether or not the
defendant was an Indian.102
Mr. White Horse, just like Zepeda, committed a crime that falls within
both statutes.103 Had the Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s
reasoning, there would have been no need to delve into the sufficiency of
the evidence of Zepeda’s Indian status since the court still had jurisdiction
under the GCA. Essentially, specific to the facts of Zepeda, his status as
Indian should not have been dispositive as to whether the court had
jurisdiction.
It is hard to grasp exactly why the Ninth Circuit chose the route it took. It
seems wildly unnecessary to engage in the discussion which is, at times,
inconsistent with the court’s own precedent. For instance, the court
discussed at length the decision in United States v. Maggi to support the
proposition that a bloodline traceable to a federally recognized tribe was an
essential part of the first prong of the Bruce Test.104 Maggi dealt with two

99. 316 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 771.
101. Id. at 772.
102. Id. at 772–73.
103. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 775 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that assault fell
within the jurisdictional reach of the General Crimes Act).
104. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 210 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).
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defendants, Gordon Mann and Shane Maggi.105 Mann claimed to be a
member of the Little Shell Tribe of the Chippewa Cree, a tribe that is not
federally recognized,106 unlike Zepeda, where the reference to Tohono
O’odham may or may not have been to a federally recognized tribe. More,
the court found that the “Blackfeet” blood of Maggi was sufficiently
traceable to a federally recognized tribe even though the name on the BIA
list is the “Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of
Montana.”107 The court stretches its precedent so far that it becomes hardly
recognizable. The errors in the opinion, such as the mistaken reference to
“Tiho” instead of “T.O.” or “Ak-Chin Indian Reservation” rather than the
“Maricopa (Ak-Chin) Indian Reservation,” would be forgivable in many
contexts. However, in an opinion where the harbinger of the court’s
argument is that the defendant’s blood certificate said “Tohono O’odham”
instead of “Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona,” such mistakes are
unacceptable.
VIII. Conclusion
Damien Zepeda was an enrolled member of the Gila River Indian
Community.108 This community of federally recognized Indians, enjoying
that status since at least 1934,109 conferred on him the status of a federally
recognized Indian by way of an official document - his “Tribal Enrollment
Certificate.”110 The Ninth Circuit applied a test, which makes federal
jurisdiction under the MCA exclusively applicable to people of a certain
race.111 Although evidence was presented that (1) Damien Zepeda was an
enrolled member of a federally recognized Indian community, and (2) that
his blood was “1/4 Pima” and “1/4 Tohono O’odham,” the court overturned
his conviction based on the idea that no juror could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that his bloodline was derived from a federally recognized
tribe.112 Neither the official documents presented, the testimony of tribal
officials, nor even the testimony of Zepeda's brother as to his lineage was
sufficient evidence. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit established precedent
supporting the argument that an official document from a federally
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Maggi, 598 F.3d at 1076.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 204.
DAVIS, supra note 11, at 440.
Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 204.
Id.
Id. at 204–05, 213.
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recognized tribe, which contains a certificate specifying the degree of
Indian blood of the enrolled member, is insufficient to prove that a person
has a necessary degree of blood from a federally recognized tribe.113
The Zepeda court shows, in striking fashion, why courts should not be
deciding who is or is not an Indian. The lack of uniformity of a definition of
“Indian” in federal legislation - there are, in fact, over thirty-three different
definitions under federal law114 - is evidence of the inability of Indians to fit
neatly into a box of western ideology. Though the Supreme Court has
recognized the unconstitutionality of premising Indian status on race, the
application of the law, particularly in criminal jurisdiction, continues to
focus on race.115 Whether or not individual tribes continue to use blood
quantum as part of their enrollment requirements is, as a matter of law, their
sovereign power.116 As a matter of science, however, strict adherence to
blood quantum requirements will eventually lead to the “extinction” of
Indian tribes.117 But in any case, blood quantum as a concept is a distinctly
non-Indian idea that has more or less been forced on the tribes by federal
regulation.118 If the tribes choose to require blood quantum, so be it, but it is
a choice that the tribes, not the courts, can make. For federal criminal
jurisdiction, the test as to whether someone is an Indian should end after a
determination of whether or not they are enrolled members of a federally
recognized tribe.
Damien Zepeda is an Indian. He is not an Indian just because he has
Pima blood in his veins. His Tohono O’odham blood does not make him an
Indian either. The Gila River Indian Community, in its sovereign power, a
power inherent to it and recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the
federal government at large, recognizes Damien Zepeda as an Indian. For
the purposes of federal Indian law, that makes him an Indian, and it is
emphatically not the province of the federal courts to say otherwise.

113. Id. at 213.
114. Brownell, supra note 44, at 278.
115. See generally United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
116. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978).
117. Ruth Hopkins, In the Spirit of Our Ancestors, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Aug. 31, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/08/31/spiritour-ancestors.
118. Id.
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